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Experiments and Surveys in Contrast and Combination
* 
 
Trust is a concept that has attracted significant attention in economic theory and research 
within the last two decades: it has been applied in a number of contexts and has been 
investigated both as an explanatory and as a dependent variable. In this paper, we explore 
the questions of what exactly is measured by the diverse survey-derived scales and 
experiments claiming to measure trust, and how these different measures are related. Using 
nationally representative data, we test a commonly used experimental measure of trust for 
robustness to a number of interferences, finding it to be mostly unsusceptible to stake size, 
the extent of strategy space, the use of the strategy method, and the characteristics of the 
experimenters. Inspired by criticism of the widespread trust question used in many surveys, 
we created a new, improved survey trust scale consisting of three short statements. We show 
that the dimension of this scale is distinct from trust in institutions and trust in known others. 
Our new scale is a valid and reliable measure of trust in strangers. The scale is valid in the 
sense that it correlates with trusting behaviour in the experiment. Both survey and 
experimental measure correlate with related factors such as risk aversion, being an 
entrepreneur or a shareholder. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the survey measure's test-
retest reliability (six weeks) is high. The experimental measure of trust is, on the other hand, 
not significantly correlated with trust in institutions nor with trust in known others. We 
conclude that the experimental measure of trust refers not to trust in a general sense, but 
specifically to trust in strangers. 
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In surveys like the General Social Survey (GSS) or the World Values Survey (WVS), trust
is measured with the statement "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" This measure of trust
has been criticized and its behavioural relevance has been called into question.
The rst systematic study of the relation between survey and behavioural measures
of trust was reported by Glaeser et al. (2000). They investigated whether behaviour
in a trust game is correlated with this standard survey measure of trust. They nd
that the above question is not correlated with trusting behaviour. This result has been
replicated in several other studies (e.g., Ashraf et al. 2003, Ermisch et al. 2007, Gachter
et al. 2004, Haile et al. 2008, Holm & Nystedt 2008, Johansson-Stenman et al. 2005b).
However, other studies have found a signicant correlation between the survey and the
experimental measures (e.g., Vyrastekova & Garikipati 2005, Bellemare & Kroeger 2007,
Sapienza et al. 2007). Based on the previous research one cannot conclude whether the
GSS question is behaviourally relevant in the sense that it correlates with the behaviour
in the trust game.
What are the reasons for these con
icting results? Are the experiment and the survey
measures both valid and reliable measures of trust? Concerning survey measures, several
studies have revealed that the GSS question is neither a valid nor a reliable measure
of trust (Reeskens & Hooghe 2008). The question is rather imprecise, the possible
answers are not mutually exclusive, and only one item is not considered to be a reliable
measurement (e.g., Glaeser et al. 2000, Miller & Mitamura 2003, Yamagishi et al. 1999).
Concerning the experimental measure, little is known about its sensitivity and validity
in large and heterogeneous populations.1 Against this background, it is no surprise that
there is no clear relationship between survey and experimental measures of trust.
The aim of this article is to connect the survey measures and the experimental
measures of trust. In particular, we would like to show that survey and experimental
1Most experiments are run with students as subjects
2measures can be connected in a large representative survey. Since the experimental
measure might capture a very specic dimension of trust, we created a new survey
measure of trust that, on the one hand, takes recent criticisms of the GSS question into
account, and on the other, measures the same dimension of trust as the experiment.
To avoid confusion we have to clarify rst what we mean by the word "trust". We
largely follow James Coleman's concept of trust (Coleman 1990). From his perspective,
the following two points characterise the action of placing trust. On the one hand, trust
implies that the truster freely transfers assets to another person, without controlling the
actions of that other person or having the possibility to retaliate. On the other hand,
there must be a potential gain in order to have an incentive to trust. The incentive is such
that the truster is better o than not having trusted if the other person is trustworthy,
and worse o if the other person does not merit the trust placed in him/her. Note
that in this concept, trust is considered a form of behaviour rather than as a personal
characteristic or personal trait.
Our new survey measure is more precise than the GSS question on what dimension
of trust is measured. We focus on trust in strangers. We have used this new survey
measure in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) study and several independent
studies that are all representative for the German population. In order to distinguish
the newly developed trust questions from the GSS question, we refer to them as "SOEP-
trust". A factor analysis shows that SOEP-trust (trust in strangers) measures a dierent
dimension of trust than questions on trust in institutions and trust in known others.
Further, we show that SOEP-trust is a valid and a sensitive measure of trust. Concerning
the latter, we nd that SOEP-trust is correlated with social desirability and the position
in the survey. Furthermore, trust is only moderately stable over three weeks. This has
implications for the use of the survey question in international comparisons and over
time.
The design of the simplied trust game is as follows. Two players are each endowed
with 10 euros. The rst mover decides how many of his or her 10 euros he or she would
like to transfer to the second mover. Each transfer is doubled by the experimenters.
3The second mover then gets to know the rst mover's transfer and then decides him or
herself about the back-transfer. As with the rst mover, the second mover can transfer
any amount between zero and ten euros. The second mover's transfer is doubled as
well. Then the game is over and both participants are paid by a cheque. In order to
distinguish the experiment from other trust measures we refer to it as "EXP-trust" in
the following.
Our implementation of the experiment in a large survey has several advantages over
an ordinary laboratory experiment. With our survey measure of trust, we are able to
directly check whether only highly trusting people decide to participate in the trust
game. Since this is a panel study, we can additionally check whether less trusting people
are more likely to leave the panel in the future. Further, we can compare students and
non-students in the same experimental setting (design and procedure).
Another advantage of the combination of survey and experiments is that we can
use the information in the survey to validate EXP-trust. We thus analyse whether
the decision to trust is in
uenced by risk preferences, sel
essness, and expectations, as
postulated by economic theory. We also assessed the sensitivity of the experimental
design to a social desirability bias, the stake size, and the available strategy space.
We nd that EXP-trust is surprisingly robust and also not subject to a social de-
sirability bias, and not dependent on the exact stake size or on the size of the strategy
space. Furthermore, we nd that for subjects who are familiar with the interview situa-
tion (i.e., through previous participation in a panel study), selection into the experiment
is not subject to their level of trust. In contrast, for subjects who have not previously
been part of a panel study, more trusting people are more likely to participate in the
experiment. And contrary to previous research, we nd that students are more trust-
ing than non-students, which has consequences for the generalisability of experimental
results from students to the general population.
Finally we analyse what kind of trust the experiment actually measures. We nd
that EXP-trust measures people's trust in strangers, but not their trust in institutions or
in known others. That is, EXP-trust is signicantly correlated with the newly developed
4SOEP-trust measure. Past trusting behaviour is a good predictor of the behaviour in
the trust game as well.
Thus, on a representative level for Germany, we show that survey and experimental
measures of trust are connected in the way that the trust game measures a specic
dimension of trust, that is, trust in strangers.
In the following, we rst analyse the survey measure of trust (SOEP-trust), and in
the second part analyse the experimental trust measure (EXP-trust). In the third part,
we combine these two measures and analyse their similarities and dierences.
2 Using Surveys to Measure Trust
In this chapter, we propose a new measure of trust in strangers and analyse its sensitivity,
reliability, and validity. In particular, we show that trust in strangers measures a specic
dimension of trust that is distinct from other dimensions like trust in institutions or trust
in known others. We implement this entire analysis in the framework of the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a household panel that contained 22,611
individuals in 12,061 households in the year 2003, comprising a representative sample for
Germany (Wagner et al. 2007). Additionally, we conducted four accompanying studies
(AS), one each year from 2002 to 2006. These accompanying studies all have a randomly
drawn sample of 400 to 1,000 observations of the German population and are thus
representative for Germany as well. Together these data sets provide a great tool to
assess survey questions in a large heterogeneous population. In Table A.1 we list all the
studies used and give an overview of which study we used to implement the dierent
variations of the study design. In Appendix A.2, we discuss whether our results can be
viewed as representative for trust.
52.1 SOEP-trust | A New Measure of Trust
The General Social Survey (GSS) measure of trust, together with the quite similar
question in the World Values Survey (WVS)2 is probably the most widely used question
to measure trust in surveys.
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
 Most people can be trusted
 Cant be too careful
This question measures people's expectations of others' trustworthiness. Based on our
concept of trust, expectations about other people's trustworthiness is an important factor
in deciding whether one decides to trust or distrust. The advantage of this question is
that the same question is used over time and space, thus allowing a wide array of
dierent analyses. However, it has been criticized that the respondents have the choice
between trust and caution and not between trust and distrust or between cautious and
incautious behaviour (for a review, see Yamagishi et al. 1999). Although trust and
caution are dicult to disentangle, it is important to measure them separately, since
trust and caution are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The interpretation of the GSS
question can therefore dier widely among dierent societies (e.g., Gabriel et al. 2002).
Miller & Mitamura (2003) showed, for example, that Japanese students are more trusting
than Americans measured with the above question from the GSS. Measuring trust and
caution separately, they nd, however, that American students are more trusting than
Japanese students but at the same time also more cautious. These diering results
clearly demonstrate the problems for the interpretation of the above question.
Based on this evidence, we decided to create a new measure of trust using the German
Socio-Economic Panel. We split the GSS question up into two parts. On the one hand,
we asked people to what extent they agree with the following two statements:
2Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very
careful in dealing with people? Most people can be trusted OR Need to be very careful.
6 In general, you can trust people.
 Nowadays, you can't rely on anybody.
The possible answers on a four point rating scale were "disagree strongly", "disagree
somewhat", "agree somewhat", or "agree strongly".
Another criticism of the GSS question is that answers may dier signicantly de-
pending on whether people understand "most people" in the question as meaning ac-
quaintances or strangers (Reeskens & Hooghe 2008). We therefore let people rate their
agreement with two further statements about trust and caution, in which we clearly
state that trust towards strangers is meant and not towards family or friends:
 How much do you trust strangers you meet for the rst time.
 When dealing with strangers, it's better to be cautious before trusting them.
The possible answers on a four-point rating scale were either "no trust at all", "little
trust", "quite a bit of trust", and "a lot of trust" for the rst question and "disagree
strongly", "disagree somewhat", "agree somewhat", or "agree strongly" for the second
question. These four statements constitute our new measure of trust in strangers. To
distinguish it from GSS trust, we will call it SOEP-trust in the following.
The emphasis on trust in strangers takes into account that trust is a multidimensional
concept. To test whether SOEP-trust measures trust in strangers specically, we let
people rate other statements on trust in dierent institutions like the police or the
government and in acquaintances like friends and family. The list of items can be seen
in Table 1. People could answer on the scale from "no trust at all", "little trust", "quite
a bit of trust", to "a lot of trust". Because of the multidimensionality of trust, these
items are expected to measure dierent aspects of trust. A principal component analysis
over all the trust items can show us how many dimensions these items measure. We nd
that these items represent three distinct components.
Table 1 reports the factor loadings of the dierent items. The bold numbers indicate
the component to which each item belongs. Each component has a straightforward
7interpretation. The rst factor can be interpreted as trust in institutions, the second
factor as trust in strangers, and the third factor as trust in known others. The second
component consists of all the items of SOEP-trust and can thus be interpreted as "trust
in strangers". This clearly shows that SOEP-trust measures the specic trust people
have in strangers. It can clearly be distinguished from trust in institutions and known
others.
Table 1: Dimensions of Trust
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3
Trust in Trust in Trust in
institutions strangers known others
How much trust do you have in...
... parliament 0.742 0.173 -0.006
... public authorities 0.715 0.139 0.107
... the European Union 0.686 0.163 0.004
... courts 0.665 0.085 0.092
... large companies 0.581 -0.003 0.033
... churches 0.460 0.218 0.193
... schools and the educational system 0.564 0.088 0.193
... press 0.550 0.076 0.081
... labour unions 0.493 0.015 0.028
... police 0.584 -0.015 0.273
... your own family 0.070 -0.051 0.647
... neighbours 0.115 0.165 0.716
... friends 0.045 0.145 0.695
... strangers 0.183 0.636 0.091
To what extent do you agree or disagree?
In general, you can trust people. 0.155 0.647 0.268
Nowadays, you can't rely on anybody. -0.106 -0.666 -0.229
It's better to be cautious before trusting strangers. -0.050 -0.685 0.154
Notes: Factor analysis using the principal components factor method and an orthogonal vari-
max rotation. The table reports the rotated factor loadings for the three factors with an
eigenvalue larger than 1.
Source: AS02, AS03, AS04, AS05, and AS06 with a total of 3,180 observations.
8For each of the three dimensions we calculated count indices3. The reliability of these
scales measured by Cronbach's alpha is quite good. It is 0.82 for the index on trust in
institutions, 0.62 for trust in known others, and 0.66 for SOEP-trust. Having introduced
these three measures of trust we are interested how sensitive these measures are.
2.2 Sensitivity of SOEP-trust
In this section we assess the sensitivity of SOEP-trust. We check whether the position in
the survey matters, whether there is a social desirability bias, and whether SOEP-trust
is a stable and reliable measure.
2.2.1 Position in the Survey
We varied the position of the items of SOEP-trust in the AS06. Subjects were randomly
divided into two groups. In one group, the trust questions were asked early in the
questionnaire (number 33 out of 118 questions) and in the other group towards the end
(question 93). We compare the ranking and the variance of this variable. The latter
is clearly not dependent on the position in the survey (Levene's robust test statistic
for the equality of variances: F(1, 1039) = 0.169 P > 0.681). However, the ranking is
aected. Respondents who were asked the questions late in the survey exhibit more trust
in strangers than people who answered the question early in the questionnaire (Table
2). Since the four preceding questions were the same in both situations, this eect is
not likely to be driven by dierent preceding questions but by the position in the survey.
Although the size of the eect is rather small, this suggests that to compare trust across
time or space, the items have to have a similar position within the survey.
3The count indices are the mean answer of the non-missing items that load highest on each of the
three dimensions. The bold numbers indicate which item loads highest on which dimension. The value
for a person is calculated as soon as at least two items per component are non-missing. For the count
index SOEP-trust we additionally made sure that at least one caution item and one trust item was
included. For the count index trust in known others, we additionally included an item about trust in
co-workers. This item was not included in the factor analysis, since only people with a job are asked.
An inclusion would thus exclude a major share of the population.
9Table 2: Position of the trust questions within the survey
Position in Wilcoxon
To what extent do you agree survey rank-sum
or disagree? (percentage agreeing) early late test (p)
- In general, you can trust people. 72.8% 73.4% > 0.298
- Nowadays, you can't rely on anybody. 36.3% 32.3% < 0.073
- It's better to be cautious before
trusting strangers. 89.4% 88.2% < 0.023
Count-index: SOEP-trust early < late < 0.017
Source: AS06 with a total of 1,033 observations.
2.2.2 Social Desirability
We measure social desirability by the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding
(BIDR) developed by Paulhus (1991). Based on this, Winkler et al. (2006) developed a
short version that is suitable for large surveys in the general population. The BIDR has
two dimensions. One is called "self-deceptive enhancement" and captures a tendency to
see reality in a more optimistic way than justied. This self-deception is not thought
to be conscious. The other dimension is called "impression management" and measures
the degree to which a person consciously tries to construct a favourable picture of other
people. Since trust is desirable in society, trust questions are found to be correlated with
scales of social desirability (Rotter 1967).
We nd that the dimension "impression management" is signicantly positively cor-
related with the survey measures SOEP-trust (Spearman's rank correlation:  = 0.11),
trust in known others ( = 0.15) and trust in institutions ( = 0.14). The correlations
of survey trust measures with "self-deceptive enhancement" are quite low and only sig-
nicant for SOEP-trust ( = 0.07, p < 0.051) and trust in known others ( = 0.08, p <
0.036). The correlation is not signicant with trust in institutions ( = -0.00).
Thus, people who are subject to a social desirability bias are likely to overstate their
trust in strangers, known others, and institutions. This calls into question the validity
of these measures of trust and makes comparisons across space and time dicult.
102.2.3 Stability and Reliability
We assessed the stability of SOEP-trust by repeating core questions of the AS05 six weeks
later with a sub-sample (n = 193). If trust measured in a survey is a stable measure, we
expect a correlation close to one. We nd that SOEP-trust is only a moderately stable
measure since the Spearman's rank correlation coecient between the two time periods
is 0.484. The trust level did not change for one-third of the participants, increased
for 37%, and decreased for 30%. Since trust is only moderately stable over time, the
reliability of SOEP-trust cannot be assessed through a simple correlation. Instead we
used a composite reliability test according to Raykov (2004), which tests whether a single
factor underlies a certain set of variables. A structural equation model approach is used
to calculate the reliability coecient . We nd that it is 0.81. This shows that our
measure of SOEP-trust is a reliable measure of trust. In sum, though SOEP-trust is
only moderately stable across time, it does prove to be a reliable measure of trust.
2.3 Validity of SOEP-trust
In the previous section we showed that our new survey measure of trust has a high level
of reliability but is sensitive to the position and also has a social desirability bias. In this
section, we assess the validity of the new measure in two dierent ways. First, we used a
survey measure of past trusting behaviour (Glaeser et al. 2000). Relying on self-reports,
we asked people: "How often do you..."
 ...lend personal possessions to your friends (CDs, books, your car, bicycle etc.)?
 ...lend money to your friends?
 ...leave your door unlocked?
Respondents' answers were either "never", "infrequently", "sometimes", "often", or
"very often". A factor analysis conrms the one-dimensionality of these three items.
4The items of SOEP-trust are correlated as follows: \In general you can trust people" with 0.41,
\Nowadays, you can't be too careful" with 0.45 and \It's better to be cautious before trusting strangers"
with 0.34.
11We interpret this as past trusting behavior trusting . The reliability of these items in a
count index is 0.56. A rst indication that the new trust measure is valid stems from
the fact that it correlates signicantly with past trusting behavior (Table 3: Spearman's
 = 0.17). Concerning the other two dimensions, we nd that trust in known others
correlates signicantly with past trusting behaviour (Spearman's  = 0.08) whereas the
correlation with trust in institutions is essentially zero and not signicant. The latter is
not surprising since the past trusting behaviour has little to do with trust in institutions.
A second way of assessing the validity of the new trust measure is to compare it to other
established measures of trust. Apart from the formulation in the World Values Survey,
we used two other well-established measures of trust, namely the question from the Eu-
ropean Social Survey (ESS) and the original 10 items of the dimension "agreeableness"
from the NEO-PI-R that measures trust. The ESS-trust question simply asked people
on an 11-point Likert scale how much trust they have in others. As can be seen in Table
3, this ESS-trust correlates highly ( = 0.47) with our new measure of trust. A similar
correlation of 0.55 can be observed between the new measure of trust with the trust
factor of the NEO-PI-R and of 0.53 with the GSS question.
From this we conclude that SOEP-trust is a valid measure of trust in strangers, and
is well connected to existing survey measures of trust.
3 Using Experiments to Measure Trust
In this section we assess the sensitivity and validity of EXP-trust in a common frame-
work. Despite its frequent use in economic research, we are not aware of any other study
that analyses the sensitivity and validity of the trust game in depth and at the same
time in the same framework. Furthermore, we have chosen to run the experiment with
a representative sample in order to compare the experiment directly with representative
surveys. Since not all randomly selected persons agree to participate in an experiment,
it is important to check whether results from the experiment can be generalised to a
whole population. That is why we start by analysing a possible selection eect, then
12Table 3: Correlations between dierent concepts of trust in surveys: ESS, NEO-A1, and
GSS
self-report. ESS NEO-A1 GSS
trusting
behaviour
SOEP-trust 0.17*** 0.47*** 0.55*** 0.53***
- In general you can trust people. 0.10*** 0.37*** 0.49*** 0.47***
- Nowadays, you can't rely on anybody. -0.15*** -0.34*** -0.40*** -0.39***
- It's better to be cautious before
trusting strangers. -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.31*** -0.48***
- Trust in rst-time met stranger 0.08*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.22**
Trust in known others 0.08*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.34***
Trust in Institutions 0.02 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.29***
Notes: Spearman's rank correlations. The table reports the correlation coecients and the signicance
level is denoted as follows:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Source: AS02, AS03, AS04, AS05, and AS06 and the data on the GSS trust question was collected in a
separate student survey at Royal Holloway, University of London in June 2008.
analyse its sensitivity and validity.
3.1 Design of the Experiment
The design of the experiment to measure trust is based on the investment game intro-
duced by Berg et al. (1995). Two players anonymously interact with each other in the
following way. The rst mover gets an endowment of 10 points and can transfer zero
to ten points to the second mover. Every point that is transferred is doubled by the
experimenters. The second mover also gets an endowment of ten points. After receiving
points from the rst mover, he/she decides on how much of the endowment to transfer
back to the rst mover (zero to ten points). As with the rst mover's transfer, the back-
transfer by the second mover is doubled by the experimenters. After the second mover's
decision, the game ends and the subjects are paid their income in euro (one point equals
one euro) by cheque sent a few days later.
This design was developed by Fehr, Fischbacher, Schupp, von Rosenbladt & Wag-
ner (2002) and it was implemented in the SOEP 2003 and in the AS02. In the other
two accompanying studies, we used a small variation of the design. In the AS03, we
13implemented the strategy method for the second mover. In order not to make it too
complicated, we restricted the options of both players to transfer either zero, ve, or ten
points to the other player. In the AS04, we removed the option to transfer half of the
endowment to the other player by allowing them to transfer only zero, two, four, six,
eight, or ten points to the other player. In the SOEP 2003 we implemented a high-stakes
treatment that used an exchange rate of one point to ten euros for a small part of the
sample (117 out of 1,432). Thus, both players had an endowment of one hundred euros.
The Nash equilibrium of this trust game can be described as follows. If we assume
that both players are rational and selsh and that this is common knowledge, neither
one of the players ever transfers a single point to the other. We can relax the assump-
tion that both players are selsh and instead assume that both players are inequality-
averse as described by Fehr & Schmidt (1999). If the second mover is inequality-averse
enough( > 1
3), his/her back-transfer is equal to the rst mover's transfer. If the sec-
ond mover's inequality-aversion is not common knowledge, the rst mover's transfer
depends on his/her belief about the probability that the second mover will equalise
the inequality. If this belief is above a certain threshold, the rst mover transfers the
whole endowment and otherwise nothing at all. One can show that the more inequality-
averse the rst mover, the higher this threshold is. Another relaxing assumption is
that players have a preference for reciprocity instead for complete selshness (Falk &
Fischbacher 2006). With this assumption, the second mover's back-transfer increases
weakly with the strength of his/her preference for reciprocity. Note that the predic-
tion is not only a back-transfer of zero or equal to the rst mover's transfer, but that
transfers in between are possible as well. However, the rst mover's transfer is predicted
to be either zero points or the whole endowment. He/she will transfer zero points if
his/her second-order beliefs are low enough, that is, below a certain threshold. Other-
wise, rst movers will transfer the whole endowment. This threshold increases with the
rst mover's degree of reciprocity. Thus, the more reciprocal a rst mover is, the less
he/she is predicted to transfer in a trust game.
In sum, a preference for equity or reciprocity increases the likelihood that the second
14mover is behaving in a trustworthy manner. However, it decreases the probability that
the rst mover trusts given the second mover's preferences.
3.2 Selection
Imagine the situation that someone knocks on your door and asks you to participate in
a survey on politics and society that would last about an hour. Included in the survey
is a "game" in which you can earn some money. Many people will be suspicious and
mistrust the person at the door. This situation is common for the interviewers in the
social research section of TNS Infratest in Munich. They conduct the interviews for
SOEP's accompanying studies as well as for the panel study itself. Besides other factors,
the distrust in the interviewer and/or the survey organisation may lead people to refuse
to participate in the survey.
If one wants to study trust on a representative level, it is therefore crucial to avoid a
randomisation bias (Heckman & Smith 1995) due to trust. The issue has grown in impor-
tance in light of recent criticism of experimental economics (Levitt & List 2007), which
is confronted with the same selection problem. So far, however, there has been little
discussion about selection into either lab or eld experiments. In one of the few studies
that has addressed the problem, Bellemare & Kroeger (2007) do not nd any randomi-
sation bias for a trust experiment in a random sample of 541 regular panel participants
in the Netherlands. Contrary, Harrison et al. (forthcoming) nd a randomisation bias
in a sample of 253 Danish subjects who were not part of a panel study but recruited for
a "snapshot study" like our accompanying studies. They found that risk-averse people
were less likely to participate in their study. These two studies indirectly assess the
randomisation bias for the variable of interest.
The aim of this section is to examine the two possible randomisation biases in our
study design. The rst is that less trusting persons will be less likely to participate in
the survey and second, that conditional on participation in the survey, it is less likely
that they will agree to participate in the experiment at the end of the questionnaire. It
is important to analyse these eects separately, since survey respondents know what the
15survey is about, while participants in an experiment normally do not see its ultimate
purpose.
The participation bias in the survey can be addressed by weighting subjects such
that the distribution of basic variables conforms to the German population (Kroh &
Spie 2008). We can then compare the level of trust with and without weights. Dierent
levels would then be an indication that selection is an issue. Indeed we do not nd any
indication that the weighted mean is signicantly dierent from the unweighted one in
the panel or in the accompanying studies. The average weighted transfer (mean: 5.15;
n = 1454) lies in the 95% condence interval of the unweighted mean (5.02 - 5.31). This
holds also for the panel and the accompanying studies separately.
The second randomisation bias, refusal to participate in the experiment, can be ad-
dressed by comparing trust measured in the survey for participants in the experiment
with non-participants. Since all the subjects who refused to participate in the experiment
completed the survey, we are able to directly assess their trust through trust measured
in the survey. As a proxy for trust in the interviewer and the survey organisation, we
take SOEP-trust and past trusting behaviour. The latter captures the experience of past
interactions that involved trusting others. We nd that in the SOEP, past trusting be-
haviour nor SOEP-trust are related to the refusal to participate in the experiment (Mann
Whitney test: past trusting behaviour z=0.673 p>0.500; SOEP-trust 0.505 p>0.613).
Contrary to the SOEP, we nd in the accompanying studies a signicant lower level of
trust among people who refused to participate in the experiment than those who partic-
ipated (Mann Whitney test: past trusting behaviour z=2.23 p<0.026; SOEP-trust 1.322
p>0.185).
One likely explanation for a randomisation bias due to trust in the AS but not in
the SOEP is based on the dierent set-ups. In the SOEP, subjects are familiar with
the survey organisation and usually also with the interviewer, since these persons have
been participants in the panel for three years. In accompanying studies, on the other
hand, people are coming into contact with the survey organisation and the interviewer
for the rst time. In the accompanying studies, we nd that in 2003, 5.1% and in 2004,
1610.8% of subjects refused to participate in the experiment. In the panel study SOEP,
only 4.8% of 1,504 subjects who completed the questionnaire refused to participate in
the experiment in 2003. The dierence in refusal rates between AS and SOEP is highly
signicant (Fisher's exact test: p<0.001).
This interpretation is supported by the following two facts. First, the null eect in
the SOEP cannot be explained by a ceiling eect, since past trusting behaviour is even
slightly higher in the accompanying studies than in the SOEP 2003. Second, we nd
that people who refuse to participate in the experiment are also more likely to leave the
panel in the following three years (Fisher's exact test: p<0.001). However, the people
who left the panel did not exhibit dierent trust levels in the experiment (Mann-Whitney
test: z=0.387 p>0.698) or in the survey (Mann-Whitney test: past trusting behaviour
z=0.849 p>0.395; SOEP-trust z=1.529 p>0.126).
In the accompanying studies, people were asked about their willingness to participate
in a similar study another time. Similar to the panel study, we nd that people who
refuse to participate in the experiment are also less willing to participate another time
in a similar study (Mann-Whitney test: z=10.641 p<0.000). Unlike in the panel study,
we nd that people who are less willing to participate in another similar study exhibit
less trust in the experiment (Spearman's rank correlation  = 0.08 p<0.034) as well as
in the survey (Spearman's rank correlation: past trusting behaviour  = 0.13 p<0.001;
SOEP-trust  = 0.02 p>0.504).
Concerning risk-aversion we nd very similar results as those for trust and found in
Harrison et al. (forthcoming). We measured people's risk aversion by asking "Are you
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking
risks?". People answered on a Likert scale. This measure of risk-aversion is shown to
be a valid measure by comparison to a lottery experiment with real monetary stakes
(Dohmen et al. 2007). As with trust, we nd that in the panel study SOEP, 5 there is no
signicant relation between risk preferences and the participation rate (Mann-Whitney
5The question on risk aversion was asked one year after the experiment in 2004. We assume that risk
preferences are stable over this time period
17test: z=1.487 p>0.136), whereas in the AS03 the most risk-averse people are less likely
to participate in the experiment than the least risk-averse (Mann-Whitney test: z=2.135
p<0.033).
Thus, our results suggest that representative trust games are subject to selection
eects due to trust and risk preferences if subjects are unfamiliar with the situation they
are in (e.g., unknown survey organisation and/or interviewer).
In Appendix A.3, we additionally analyse other factors that might in
uence the par-
ticipation in the experiment, including social preferences, personality, and demographic
variables. In sum we nd that sel
essness, reciprocity, and interviewer characteristics do
not matter in the decision to participate in the experiment. A medium income, a large
household size, and living in Eastern Germany reduce the probability that a person will
refuse to participate. Finally, the longer the previous questionnaire lasted, the more
likely it is that participants will refuse to participate in the present experiment in the
AS.
In sum, we found that the level of trust is related to the decision to participate
in the experiment for subjects who are participating for the rst time in this kind of
interview. On the other hand, trust has no in
uence if subjects are familiar with the
general set-up of the study. Based on these ndings we conclude that a longitudinal panel
survey where a "trust relationship" between the survey institute and the respondents
is already established is the best way to minimise the total response error when adding
experimental add-ons.
3.3 Validity of experimental measure
The decision to trust is in
uenced by people's preferences and expectations. Risk and
social preferences and expectations about the other player's behaviour are expected to
shape the decision to trust (Coleman 1990). Thus, one can check the validity of the
trust measure by showing that these preferences and expectations indeed correlate with
EXP-trust.
We measured people's risk-aversion as outlined in section 3.2. We nd that the
18rst mover transfer is higher the less risk-averse people are in AS03 (Spearman's rank
correlation  = 0.13 p<0.012).6 Thus, people's risk preferences in
uence their decisions
to trust or mistrust.
Sel
essness is one component of social preferences, and we measured sel
essness by
asking people how often they volunteer in clubs and social services. They answered by
indicating whether they volunteered "never", "seldom", "at least once a month", "at
least once a week", or "daily". This question is asked in every AS and in the SOEP. We
nd that the more often people volunteer | thus behaving more sel
essly | the more
they transfer to the second mover (Spearman's rank correlation  = 0.06 p<0.016).
In the AS03 we elicited rst movers' expectations by asking how much they expected
the second mover to transfer back if they were to transfer zero, ve, or ten points to the
second mover. A selsh rst mover would like to maximise his/her payo. We therefore
calculated which of the three transfers (zero, ve, or ten) a rst mover expected to
maximise his/her payo.7 The higher the transfer needed in order maximise expected
prots, the more a selsh rst mover is expected to transfer. We nd a positive and
signicant correlation (Spearman's rank correlation  = 0.20 p<0.003). However, a
non-selsh rst mover is not primarily interested in making the transfer that he/she
expects to maximise prots. If he/she cares about inequality, he/she would like to know
which of the three transfers yields the lowest inequality.8 With our data, this is also
possible to calculate, and the higher the transfer expected to minimise inequality is, the
higher we expect the rst movers' transfers to be. This other measure for expectations
is positively correlated with rst mover's transfer, as well (Spearman's rank correlation
 = 0.31 p<0.001). As a third measure, we calculate the average expected back-transfer,
which can be interpreted as a general measure for the expectation of the second mover's
sel
essness. Again, we nd a positive correlation (Spearman's rank correlation is:  =
0.18 p<0.005).
6In the SOEP the survey measure of risk was implemented in 2004, that is, one year after the
experiment took place. We still nd a signicant relation between rst-mover transfers and the risk
measure in the survey (Spearman's rank correlation  = 0.08 p<0.048).
7Where the prot was the same for two or three transfer levels, we chose the lowest of them.
8In case the inequality is the same for two or three transfer levels, we chose the higher of them.
19In sum, we have shown that EXP-trust is in
uenced by risk and social preferences
and by expectations about the second mover's behaviour. Further, in Section 4, we
demonstrate that EXP-trust is correlated with survey measures of trust. All these
results are strong indications that the EXP-trust is a valid measure of trust.
3.4 Sensitivity of experimental measure
3.4.1 Students versus general population
A common critique of laboratory experiments is that students, the preferred subject
pool in experiments, may behave systematically dierently than non-students (Levitt &
List 2007). In addition, there are a number of studies showing that students behave dif-
ferently than other groups or that economics students are dierent from non-economics
students (e.g., Fehr et al. 2006). A stronger test of the claim that students behave sys-
tematically dierently is to compare their behaviour to a representative sample of the
general population. Only a few studies have been designed this way, and the following
results are found. In the U.S. state of Vermont, Carpenter et al. (2007) found in a eld
experiment that students donated 17 dollars less to charities than non-students, who
donated 72 dollars out of 100. In a representative ultimatum game in Taiwan, no dier-
ence was found between students and non-students (Fu et al. 2007). Concerning discount
rates, Harrison et al. (2002) found that in Denmark, students have a six percentage point
higher discount rate than non-students. In a similar study in Denmark, students were
found to be more risk-averse than non-students (Harrison et al. 2007). Since students
are found to be more risk-averse and less pro-social, previous studies have suggested that
students transfer fewer points in trust games than non-students. Indeed, this result was
found by Bellemare & Kroeger (2007) for the Netherlands, where students transferred
much less in a trust experiment than a representative population sample.
Among our German sample of 1,665 rst movers in the trust game, we identify 47
as students. We nd the opposite of all previous studies in that students transfer 61%
whereas non-students transfer 50% of their endowment. Thus, students exhibit a 21%
higher level of trust than non-students. This is dierence is highly signicant (regres-
20Table 4: Dependent variable: Level of trust (rst mover transfer)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for being a student 0.967** 0.992** 0.773* 1.219**
(0.440) (0.434) (0.449) (0.570)






Household income: <2500 Euro -0.083
(Base: <1500 Euro) (0.196)
Household income: <3500 Euro -0.105
(0.218)
Household income: <5000 Euro 0.404
(0.248)
Household income: >5000 Euro 1.029***
(0.321)
Risk aversion: medium 0.309*
(Base: high) (0.181)
Risk aversion: low 0.655***
(0.246)
Constant 5.081*** 4.986*** 5.855*** 4.881***
(0.072) (0.078) (0.528) (0.136)
N 1539 1539 1539 1056
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
Notes: Models 1 - 4 are estimated using an OLS specication. Numbers in parentheses denote the
robust standard errors. The number of observations is lower in model four since data on the survey
question on risk aversion is only available for people in the SOEP and AS03. Signicance levels are
denoted :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1% Source: SOEP 2003 and AS02, AS03, and AS04
21sion 1 in Table 4). The results from the survey measure of trust strongly support these
ndings. SOEP-trust, trust in institutions, and past trusting behaviour are more pro-
nounced among students (Mann-Whitney test: SOEP-trust z = 10.521 p<0.001; trust
in institutions z = 2.88 p<0.005; trust in known others z = 0.01 p>0.99; past trusting
behaviour z = 19.78 p<0.001). Students are typically younger than the average popula-
tion, have a lower income, and a higher level of education. Do these dierent observable
characteristics explain the observed dierences? Controlling for these characteristics, we
nd that students do not trust more because they have a higher education, although
people with a university degree have a higher level of trust than those without. The
dierence between students and non-students is still highly signicant and similar in
magnitude to ndings when not controlling for university degree (regression 2 in Table
4). Further, we controlled for age and income and found that these variables decreased
the coecient for the dummy for students by about 22% but remained weakly signif-
icantly dierent from zero (regression 3 in Table 4). Thus, in the German population
with our survey measure of risk aversion, we nd that students seem to be less risk-averse
than non-students. Therefore it is important to control for whether lower risk aversion
can explain the higher level of trust among students than non-students. As expected,
risk aversion is a determinant of trusting behaviour but the dierences between students
and non-students remain highly signicant (regression 4 in Table 4). Trustworthiness
does not dier between students and non-students (regression 1 in Table 5). Thus, stu-
dents exhibit a higher level of trust than non-students. Dierences in age and income
reduce the dierence by 22% but dierent degrees of risk aversion cannot explain the
fact that students are more trusting than non-students.
3.4.2 Stakes
Only a few studies have examined the eects of stake size on behaviour in experiments.
Most of these studies have analysed the ultimatum game and found that rst movers'
oers are independent of the stake size9. However, it is also found that the respondents'
9An exception was reported by Fu et al. (2007), who found that oers decrease with stakes.
22minimal acceptable oer is lower with high stakes than with low stakes (Homan et al.
1996, Slonim & Roth 1998, Cameron 1999, Munier & Zaharia 2002, Fu et al. 2007). No
signicant eects are found in the dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994, Cherry et al.
2002, Carpenter et al. 2005, List & Cherry 2008) or in the gift-exchange game (Fehr,
Fischbacher & Tougareva 2002). Mutual trust measured in the centipede game is reduced
signicantly with lower stakes (Parco et al. 2002).
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005a) are the only ones that have studied the eect of
stake size in the trust game. In contrast to the ndings in the gift-exchange game and the
ultimatum game and in line with the centipede game, they found that rst movers' trans-
fers in rural Bangladesh were lower the higher the stakes. The proportions transferred
to the second movers was 55% in the case with low stakes. The proportion transferred
decreased to 46% in the medium-stakes condition, and to 38% in the high-stakes con-
dition. The stakes were equivalent to 67, 337 and 1683 U.S. dollars. Concerning the
behaviour of the second-mover, no dierence was found for the dierent stake sizes.
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We compared the dierences between endowments of 10 and 100 euros. Contrary to
23the results of Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005a), we nd no dierences in the average
level of trust (Figure 1: t-test: t = 0.51 p>0.607). The high-stakes endowment was ten
times higher than the low-stakes one, and so was the average transfer (5.16 versus 49.9
euros). The distributions also do not dier (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p>0.968). The
levels of trustworthiness are not dierent in the two treatments either (regression 2 in
Table 5). Our ndings are based on stakes that are rather low compared to the average
income in Germany rather low, but cover the size of many everyday trust relations.
3.4.3 Social desirability
Contrary to the questionnaire, the decision in the experiment remains private and is not
communicated to the interviewer. Thus social desirability is not expected to in
uence
the decision. We again use the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding by Paulhus
(1991). We indeed nd that impression management (Spearman's rank correlation  =
0.08 p>0.145) and self-deception (Spearman's rank correlation  = 0.03 p>0.590) are
not signicantly correlated with EXP-trust. The decision to behave trustworthily or not
is not correlated with social desirability either (regression 3 in Table 5).
24Table 5: Sensitivity of experimental measure of trustworthiness
Dependant variable: Students Stakes Social de-
dummy of being trustworthy sirability
Dummy for being a student -0.001
(0.048)
Dummy for 100 Euro treatment -0.072
(0.052)
Soc. desir.: Impression (std.) -0.020
(0.028)
Soc. desir.: self-deception (std.) -0.001
(0.028)
Controlled for rst mover transfer YES YES YES
Constant 0.535*** 0.518*** 0.606***
(0.020) (0.047) (0.058)
N 1912 602 292
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.166 0.014
Cluster on individual level YES NO NO
Notes: OLS regression with robust standard errors :  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
Source: AS02, AS03, AS04 and SOEP 2003
254 Comparing Experimental and Survey Measures of Trust
It yet remains uncertain if our experimental measure captures the same kind of trust as is
described by the various survey measures of trust. Previous research yielded ambiguous
answers when comparing EXP-trust to GSS-trust. Given the criticisms lodged against
this measure, this may not come as a surprise. In GSS-trust, it is unclear, for example,
what or who it is that we trust. In Section 2.3 we showed that GSS-trust is correlated
with several dimensions of trust such as trust in strangers, trust in known others, and
trust in institutions. Unclear relations between GSS-trust and the experimental measure
of trust are probably due to weakness of the survey question rather than problems with
the experiment. Further indications for this can be found in Glaeser et al. (2000) and
Gachter et al. (2004). Both studies report that their experimental measure of trust is
not correlated with GSS-trust.
However, Glaeser et al. (2000) and Gachter et al. (2004) nd that their experimental
measures of trust are clearly correlated with survey questions on past trusting behaviour
and a question on trust in strangers, which is formulated as the statement "You can't
count on strangers anymore" and is similar to statements on which SOEP-trust is built.
Thus, the question should not be whether survey measures of trust are correlated with
experimental measures or not, but rather what kind of trust the trust game measures.
To this eect, we measured trust in strangers (SOEP-trust), trust in known others, trust
in institutions, and past trusting behaviour.
With our surveys, we have all the ingredients needed to test what kind of trust the
trust game (EXP-trust) actually measures. We nd that EXP-trust is signicantly corre-
lated ( = 0:12) with SOEP-trust (Table 6). Not only the overall measure (SOEP-trust)
but also all its components are correlated with the experimental measure. Furthermore,
EXP-trust is not correlated with the index "trust in institutions" nor the index "trust in
known others". The fact that none of the single items of these two indexes are correlated
signicantly with EXP-trust further conrms that the experimental measure specically
measures trust in strangers.
26Table 6: Correlations of dierent survey measures of trust with EXP-trust
Spearman's sign.-level obs.

Dierent indices of survey measures of trust
SOEP-trust 0.116 0.000 1661
Trust in institutions 0.022 0.493 952
Trust in known others 0.013 0.682 949
past trusting behaviour 0.156 0.000 1654
To what extent do you agree or disagree?
In general you can trust people. 0.066 0.007 1660
Nowadays, you can't rely on anybody. -0.107 0.000 1702
It's better to be cautious before trusting strangers. -0.099 0.000 1704
How much trust do you have in...
strangers 0.137 0.000 732
your own family -0.008 0.814 946
neighbours 0.010 0.768 947
friends 0.038 0.239 946
co-worker 0.041 0.257 764
churches 0.001 0.965 940
schools and the educational system 0.054 0.102 930
press -0.014 0.669 945
labour unions -0.013 0.688 923
police 0.027 0.411 948
parliament 0.034 0.292 943
public authorities 0.025 0.439 945
the European Union 0.018 0.591 923
courts 0.037 0.259 941
large companies -0.034 0.301 931
How often do you ...
lend personal possessions to friends? 0.140 0.000 1653
lend money to your friends? 0.097 0.000 1653
leave your door unlocked? 0.107 0.000 1692
Do you think most people would try to take
advantage of you if they got a chance,
or would they try to be fair? (GSS-fair) 0.067 0.006 1679
Would you say that most of the time people
try to be helpful, or that they are mostly
just looking out for themselves (GSS-help) -0.004 0.880 1683
Source: SOEP 2003 and AS02, AS03, and AS04
27Furthermore, we nd that self-reported past trusting behaviour is signicantly cor-
related with the experimental measure of trust ( = 0:16) and that all the three items
of the index 'past trusting behaviour', { lending money, lending possessions, and leaving
the door unlocked { are signicantly related to experimental trust.
We additionally analysed two frequently used survey questions on fairness and help-
fulness that are implemented in the GSS as well. The questions are "Do you think most
people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be
fair? (GSS-fair) and "Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or
that they are mostly just looking out for themselves" (GSS-help). We nd that trusting
behaviour is signicantly positively correlated with fairness measured by GSS-fair but
that the correlation is rather low ( = 0:07). GSS-help, on the other hand, is not related
to trusting behaviour.
We have thus shown that trust measured in the experiment actually measures a
specic kind of trust, namely trust in strangers. Whereas this in itself is perhaps not
surprising, given the nature of the experiment where participants are in fact unknown
strangers to each other, it is noteworthy on the other hand that EXP-trust has almost
nothing to do with trust in institutions nor with trust in known others.
The correlations of trust measured in the experiment and SOEP-trust ( = 0:12)
and past trusting behaviour ( = 0:16) are rather low, although they are signicantly
dierent from zero. The reason for this could be that the survey measure SOEP-trust
mainly measures expectations of other people's trustworthiness. The statements "In
general, you can trust people" and "Nowadays, you can't rely on anybody" give strong
indications of how a person sees strangers. In the experiment, however, the decision to
trust or not is not only in
uenced by expectations of others' trustworthiness but also
by risk and social preferences (Naef et al. 2009). If the measure SOEP-trust in fact
mainly measures the expectation part of the motivation to trust, then we would expect
the correlations between the survey measure and expectations in the experiment to be
rather high { in particular, higher than the correlations with the actual decision (for a
related argument see also Sapienza et al. (2007)).
28Table 7: Correlations between Expectations and behaviour in the experiment
transfer expected average
to be ... expected rst-
inequality prot back- mover
minimising maximising transfer transfer
SOEP-trust 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.12***
Trust in known others 0.09 0.08 0.11* 0.01
Trust in institutions 0.13** 0.12* 0.15** 0.02
past trusting behaviour 0.17*** 0.15** 0.18*** 0.16***
(number of observations) (256) (246) (246) (var.)
Notes: Spearman's rank correlations. The table reports the correlation coecients and the signicance
level is denoted as follows:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Source: AS03
We measured rst movers' expectations of the behaviour of the second movers as
outlined in Section 3.3. We calculate three measures that are: "the transfer expected
to be prot-maximising", "the transfer expected to be inequality-minimising", and "the
mean expected back-transfer". We indeed nd that survey measures of trust correlate
more strongly with expectations than with rst mover transfers (Table 7). Interestingly,
expectations correlate not only with SOEP-trust but also with our measure for trust
in institutions as well. Thus, expectations seem to be less specic to one dimension of
trust than is the rst mover decision in the trust game. Whereas expectations measure
trust in institutions and SOEP-trust, the decision in the experiment is only related to
the survey measure for SOEP-trust.
Trust is a widely researched concept and many dierent factors have been found to
be correlated with trust. It would be interesting to see if these factors are correlated
with the experimental measure of trust similarly { or dierently { than how they are
correlated with survey measures of trust. As a further illumination of the relation of
survey and experimental measures of trust we investigate exactly this question. In order
to answer this question, we chose prominent factors that previous research has shown
to be correlated with trust. As measures of trust, we compare trusting behaviour in the
experiment, SOEP-trust, and the dierent measures of expectations in the experiment
as explained above. Several studies have reported that socio-economic variables such as
29Table 8: Dierent Trust Measures and recently found Correlations of Trust
Experi- transfer expected av.
mental SOEP SOEP to be ... exp.
trust trust trust inequal. prot back-
(same obs.) (all obs.) minim. maxim. transfer
Age -0.04* -0.01 -0.01* -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.08**
Being female -0.00 0.01 -0.02*** -0.06* -0.05 -0.05
Education 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.10***
Household Income 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.06
Being foreigner -0.05* -0.02 -0.04*** -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
Living in East Germany -0.06** -0.11*** -0.09*** 0.02 -0.03 0.01
Religious 0.00 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.07* 0.05 0.11***
Being undenominational 0.01 -0.08*** -0.06*** 0.06 0.02 0.05
Risk aversion -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.03 0.04 0.09
Negative reciprocity -0.06* -0.08* -0.10*** 0.02 0.02 -0.03
Freq. of Volunteering 0.06** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.05 0.02 0.06*
Being an Entrepreneur 0.06* 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04 -0.02 0.02
Being a shareholder 0.07* 0.05 0.12*** 0.12** 0.10** 0.05
Appr. number of obs. 1,660 1,660 25,500 800 800 800
Notes: Spearman's rank correlations. The table reports the correlation coecients and the signicance
level is denoted as follows:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Source: SOEP 2003, SOEP 2005, AS02, AS03, AS04, and AS05
age, gender, income, education, nationality, and place of living are correlated with trust
(e.g., Alesina & La Ferrara 2002, Bellemare & Kroeger 2007, Rainer & Siedler forthcom-
ing, Sutter & Kocher 2007). We nd that the behavioural trust measure and SOEP-trust
are correlated in similar ways with socio-economic variables10 (Table 8). The only ex-
ception is gender where we nd lower trust in women than in men when measured by
survey, but no gender dierence in trust when measured by experiment. Concerning reli-
gion, our results for Germany dier from previous studies in other countries (e.g., Guiso
et al. 2003). We nd that people with no religious aliation exhibit lower SOEP-trust
and people who are actively religious have higher SOEP-trust. Both eects cannot be
conrmed with the behavioural measure of trust. Risk and social preferences (volun-
teering and negative reciprocity) are correlated signicantly with both the survey and
the experimental measure of trust with similar magnitudes. Finally, trust is found to be
10We do not nd that the relation of trust and age is quadratic
30higher among entrepreneurs and shareholders (Guiso et al. 2006, Guiso et al. 2008). In
our data, we nd that both EXP-trust and SOEP-trust are higher for entrepreneurs and
shareholders. Concerning expectations, we nd that they are related to age, education,
income, religiosity, and being a shareholder, but not or only marginally to the other
factors. In sum, we nd that trust measured by the experiment has similar correlations
with factors that have been reported, as trust measured by survey. This is another
indication that both - EXP-trust as well as SOEP-trust - are valid measures of trust.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a compact survey measure of trust in strangers (SOEP-trust) that
takes into account recent criticism of the widely used GSS/WVS question. We rigourously
tested this measure and nd that it is a valid and reliable measure of trust in strangers.
However, one has to be careful in using SOEP-trust since it is a sensitive measure. This
has implications for the use of the survey question in international comparisons and over
time. This does not necessarily devalue our measure as compared to other survey trust
measures, as these most likely exhibit the same sensitivities; however, we did not explore
these.
We analysed an experimental measure of trust extensively and most importantly,
always in the same setting. We showed that there may be a selection of more trusting
people into the experiment if the individuals are participating in such a survey for
the rst time, whereas in the panel study, we do not nd that selection is an issue.
The experiment is quite insensitive to various changes. We nd that stakes, social
desirability, strategy space, and use of the strategy method do not aect the behaviour
in the experiment in signicant ways. However, we nd that students, who are typical
subjects of lab experiments, behave dierently than non-students in that they trust
strangers more than non-students. This nding is conrmed by the survey, where we
nd that SOEP-trust is higher among students than among non-students. Furthermore,
we show that trusting behaviour is in
uenced by people's risk and social preferences as
31well as their expectations.
In combination, we nd that the experimental measure of trust is signicantly cor-
related with SOEP-trust, which is specically aimed to measure trust in strangers; but
not with an index of trust in institutions and an index of trust in known others. Further-
more, experimental trust correlates with related factors similarly as SOEP-trust does.
We conclude that the common experimental measure of trust is a valid measure, which
captures a specic form of trust: trust in strangers.
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36A Appendix
A.1 Overview of the dierent studies
Table A.1: Overview of the dierent studies
Study No. of obs. stake scale strategy survey
Survey Exp. size method sensitivity
AS02 442 442 10 11 options no
SOEP 03 22'611 1'432 10/100 11 options no
AS03 846 803 10 3 options yes
AS04 772 689 10 6 options no NEO-FFI
AS05 1'012 reliability
AS06 1'063 question order
ESS question
A.2 Selection in the survey
Did only highly trusting people participate in the survey? If this were the case, we could
not claim that our results are representative for Germany. We address this potential
problem in three dierent ways. First we compare the level of trust when people are
weighted such that the distribution in some basic characteristics conforms with the
population distribution and when people are not weighted. Second, we check whether
it makes a dierence whether people are familiar with the survey organisation and/or
the interviewer or whether the situation is unfamiliar by comparing the AS03 with the
SOEP in 2003. Finally we know who has left the panel since 2003 and we can check
whether this decision is dependent on their trust level in 2003.
In the accompanying studies, the unweighted mean of SOEP-trust (2.38) lies in the
95% condence interval of the weighted mean (2.35 - 2.39). Similarly, no dierences
between the weighted and unweighted means are found for "trust in known others" or
for "trust in institutions". In the SOEP, the unweighted mean of SOEP-trust (2.308)
lies inside the 95% condence interval of its weighted mean (2.29 - 2.31) as well. Further
the weighted means in the AS03 (2.30) and in the SOEP 2003 (2.30) are not signicantly
dierent from each other (t-test: t = 0.03, p >0.974). That is, it makes no dierences for
37SOEP-trust whether it is the rst time people are interviewed, as in the accompanying
study, or whether people have been in a panel for at least four years. The nal test for
a randomisation bias is that we know who left the panel between 2004 and 2006 and we
know what their level of trust was in 2003. There is no dierence in the mean of SOEP-
trust between those who left the panel and those who stayed the following two years
(t-test = 1.24 P > 0.21). In the accompanying studies we do not have this measure, but
people were asked whether they would like to participate in similar study again. Again
this can be used as an indication whether there is a randomisation bias due to trust.
Again, we do not nd any signicant dierence (t-test = 1.34 P > 0.17).
In sum we nd that the participation in the survey in general is not in
uenced by
how much trust people have.
A.3 Selection in the experiment
Beside trust we are able to test whether social preferences, personality characteristics,
demographic variables, interviewer characteristics and the length of the questionnaire
are determinants of refusal to participate in the experiment (Table A.2). As a proxy for
social preferences we take the frequency with which subjects volunteer and participate
in politics and citizens' initiatives. Again, we nd that in the AS and in the SOEP 2003
there is no signicant impact on the rate of refusal. Concerning the personality measures
we nd that positive and negative reciprocity do not predict refusal in the experiment
either. However, some demographic variables do explain refusal to participate. There is
a slight tendency for married people to be less likely to participate in the experiment.
Further we nd that in the SOEP 2003, people with a high or low household income
are more likely to refuse to participate. In the AS, people in larger households are more
cooperative in participating, whereas East Germans are less likely to participate. A
further test is the length of the survey as a proxy for an additional response burden.
The interviews in the AS04 were conducted using a laptop that recorded the time used
for each question. We thus test whether the length of time from the beginning of the
survey to the decision to participate in the experiment predicts this decision. We indeedTable A.2: Dep = Dummy of whether a person refused to participate in the experiment
SOEP03 AS03 AS04
Dummy of volunteering at least sometimes -0.008 0.008 0.044
(0.013) (0.014) (0.028)
Dummy of participating in political parties, -0.005 0.039 -0.010





Dummy of being female 0.001 0.016 -0.028
(0.011) (0.010) (0.022)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Intermediate secondary school 0.015 -0.012 -0.007
(Base: less than interm. secon. school) (0.015) (0.011) (0.025)
High school and more -0.007 0.004 0.017
(0.014) (0.015) (0.035)
Living with partner (Base: Married) 0.010 -0.010 -0.049*
(0.025) (0.013) (0.028)
Single or not living with partner -0.009 -0.024* -0.022
(0.013) (0.012) (0.027)
Household income: <2500 Euro -0.034*** 0.003 -0.019
(Base: <1500) (0.012) (0.014) (0.028)
Household income: <3500 Euro -0.028** 0.015 -0.033
(0.013) (0.022) (0.029)
Household income: <5000 Euro -0.019 0.012 -0.042
(0.015) (0.027) (0.032)
Household income: >5000 Euro -0.009 0.008 -0.003
(0.020) (0.030) (0.055)
Household size 0.007 -0.026*** -0.011
(0.005) (0.007) (0.012)
Dummy of living in east Germany -0.011 -0.012 -0.053**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.021)
Dummy of being foreigner -0.013 0.005
(0.021) (0.061)
Length of interview (in minutes) 0.002***
(0.001)
Pr(refusal) 0.045 0.022 0.081
N 1480 716 659
log-likelihood -278.27 -107.32 -193.79
Prob > 2
crit: 0.581 0.014 0.062
Notes: Model 1 - 3 are estimated using a probit specication and the table reports the marginal eects
of the dierent variables on refusing to participate in the experiment. Numbers in parentheses denote
the standard error of the marginal eects. Signicance levels are denoted :  10%  5%    1%
Source: SOEP 2003, AS03, and AS04nd that the longer the questionnaire, the less likely it is that participants agree to
participate in the subsequent experiment in AS04.
Furthermore, the interviewer is a possible source of in
uence on participation in the
experiment. However, we do not nd interviewer characteristics such as age, gender and
years of experience to be in
uential (models 1 - 3 in Table A.3).
Table A.3: Dep = Dummy of whether a person refused to participate in the experiment
SOEP03 AS03 AS04
Years of experience in polling rm 0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Dummy for a female interviewer 0.022 -0.024 -0.040
(0.014) (0.015) (0.044)
Age of the interviewer -0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
N 1491 729 558
Adjusted R2 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Prob > Fcrit: 0.116 0.229 0.559
Notes: Models 1 - 3 are estimated using a OLS specication and the table
reports the coecients. Numbers in parentheses denote the standard error
clustered on interviewer level. Signicance levels are denoted:  10%  5%
   1%
Source: SOEP 2003, AS03, and AS04
In sum we nd that sel
essness, reciprocity, and interviewer characteristics do not
matter in the decision to participate in the experiment. A medium income, a large
household, and living in Eastern Germany reduce the probability that a persons will
refuse to participate. Finally the longer the previous questionnaire lasted, the more
likely it is that participants will refuse to participate in the present experiment in the
AS.
A.4 Sensitivity of the experimental design
A.4.1 Design
In the AS02 and the SOEP 2003 we observed that the modus of the distribution of
rst movers' choices is to transfer half of the endowment (36% and 45%). This result
is not an artefact of our specic study design or our instructions since in other studieshalf of the endowment is the modal choice as well (e.g., Berg et al. 1995, Bellemare &
Kroeger 2007). The question arises whether the widely observed pattern is dependent
on the design of the trust game. More specically we ask how the level of trust changes
if we reduce the number of choices and remove the possibility to transfer half of the
endowment. To test this, we run three dierent experiments. In the SOEP 2003, we
have run the basic experiment with 11 options for a transfer, which run from 0 to 10
points. In the AS03 we reduced the choices to only three transfer options, which were
0, 5, or 10 points. In the AS04 we eliminated the choice for a transfer of 5 points by
allowing only transfer levels of even numbers.
The distributions of transfers in the three experiments are very dierent by con-
struction (Figure A.1). However, the average transfer was almost the same in the three
experiments. In the SOEP 2003 with 11 options 51.5% of the endowments was trans-
ferred, in the AS03 51.3% and in the AS04 50.3% of the endowment was transferred.
These dierences are far from being signicant.11 The probability of behaving trust-
worthy is not dependent on how many options subjects have either (Figure A.2 and
regression 1 in Table A.4).
A.4.2 Strategy method
The strategy method is a widely used elicitation procedure in experimental economics.
With this method, second movers are asked to decide for every possible rst mover de-
cision. In the trust game, this procedure allows us to distinguish between selsh players
and conditionally cooperative players and between the latter and altruistic players. If
a second mover, for example, receives zero points from the rst mover and he/she does
not transfer back, we do not know whether he/she would transfer a positive amount
back if a rst mover transferred 5 points. The disadvantage is that it is more compli-
cated to explain to subjects and the incentives are diluted since only one decision will
actually be paid out. A further potential disadvantage is that the conditional decisions
11Two-sided T-test for dierences in the mean with unequal variances: SOEP 03 vs. AS03 t = 0.69
p>0.48; SOEP 03 vs AS04 t = 0.60 p>0.54; AS03 vs. AS04 t = 0.06 p>0.95
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are less emotionally arousing than in the situation in which one knows what the other
person decided. To our knowledge no study compares the strategy method and the di-
rect method in a trust game. Previous research on bargaining games has shown that
subjects' behaviour is dierent with the strategy method than with the direct method
(e.g., Schotter et al. 1994, Homan et al. 1998, Guth et al. 2001, Brosig et al. 2003).
Concerning social dilemma games, the only study that has analysed possible dierences
so far is a study by Brandts & Charness (2000). They analyzed a prisoner's dilemma
and a game of chicken and found no dierence. We implemented the strategy method
for the second mover in the AS03. In order not to make it too complicated, we restricted
rst movers' choices to three options, which were 0, 5, or 10 points. In the other AS and
the SOEP 2003 we used the direct method. Thus, we can compare the level of trust-
worthiness with and without the strategy method. We nd no dierence in the average
level of trustworthiness between the strategy method and the direct method (regression
2 in Table A.4). For a rst mover transfer of 5 (10) points, 91 (50)% of subjects are
trustworthy using the direct method and 88 (56)% using the strategy method12. If we
12Two-sided Fisher Exact tests: 5 points p>0.209; 10 points p>0.186
43analyse the decision of the second mover in more detail, we nd a dierence in average
return transfers for a rst mover transfer of 10 points. With the strategy method, return
transfers are higher than with the direct method (6.0 versus 6.8 points: t-test: t=-2.603
p<0.01). For the other rst mover transfers, that are 0 and 5 points, we do not nd any
signicant dierence in return transfers.
Table A.4: Sensitivity of experimental measure of trustworthiness
Dependent variable: dummy of being trustworthy Design strategy method
Dummy for design with 3 options -0.009
(0.041)
Dummy for design with 6 options 0.027
(0.025)
Dummy for strategy method (AS03) 0.010
(0.024)




Adjusted R2 0.126 0.160
Cluster on individual level YES YES
Notes: OLS regression with robust standard errors :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Source: AS02, AS03, AS04, and SOEP 2003
44